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We introduce a tractable model of endogenous growth in which the returns to innovation are determined
by the technology adoption decisions of the users of new technologies. Technology adoption involves
an implementation investment that determines the initial productivity of a new technology. After implementation,
learning increases the productivity of a technology to its full potential. In this framework, implementation
enhances growth, while growth increases obsolescence and reduces implementation. In a calibrated
version of our model, the optimal policy involves a subsidy to capital and to implementation and a
R&D tax. This policy would lead to a welfare improvement of 7.6 percent. Out of steady-state analysis
yields that the transitional dynamics of the detrended variables after a shock to capital are very similar
to the dynamics of the neoclassical growth model, but transitory shocks have permanent effects on
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Adopting a technology requires an active engagement of the adopter beyond the selection of
which technology to adopt. The initial productivity of a newly adopted technology depends
on a series of investments undertaken by the adopter. We refer to these investments as the
technology implementation process.
There is ample evidence on the importance of technology implementation. Lientz and Rea
(1998) recognize that ￿when implementing a new technology, the current business process
is often streamlined and reengineered to take advantage of the technology.￿ 1 Bikson et al.
(1987) study the determinants of success in implementing multifunction interactive computer
systems2. Their ￿ndings ￿indicate that site-to-site variations in the success of implementing
new technologies are more fully explained by di⁄erences in the implementation process than
by di⁄erences in the systems or in the organizations.￿ Moreover, Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and
Yang (2002) ￿nd evidence of substantial organizational investments to accommodate the
adoption and enhance the productivity of new IT technologies.
Despite its empirical signi￿cance, state of the art models of endogenous innovation and
growth ignore the technology implementation process. In this paper, we develop a tractable
model of endogenous development and implementation of technologies.
In our model, research and development (R&D) activities determine the potential pro-
ductivity of new technologies. The initial productivity of a new technology and its intensity
of adoption are determined, however, by the investments in implementing the technology
undertaken by the adopter. Over time, the adopter learns how to use the technology e¢ -
ciently and the actual productivity converges smoothly to the potential. This generates a
1Based on the experience of implementing Plato, an educational software, at over 5000 sites, Plato Learn-
ing Inc. has written an eight-point technology implementation guide to maximize the educational bene￿ts
from the technology. The di⁄erent stages of implementation involve (i) assigning roles prior to adopting
technology, (ii) deciding on program goals, (iii) deciding how technology will be integrated in production
process, (iv) determining who does what once the technology is adopted, (v) planning the deployment of
technology, (vi) planning technical support, (vii) training professionals and (viii) planning the evaluation of
the program goals and the implementation process.
2They use data covering 530 employees from 55 di⁄erent departments in 26 private sector organizations
2smooth di⁄usion of new technologies that resembles empirical di⁄usion curves.
Including the implementation margin in a theory of endogenous innovation and growth
has important consequences for the positive and normative implications of the model. On
the positive side, better implementation makes new technologies more productive and leads
to a faster adoption of technologies. Implementation, therefore, increases the returns to
innovation and, consequently, economic growth. Growth, in turn, a⁄ects the technology
implementation decision. In particular, since higher growth increases the rate of obsolescence
of technologies, growth decreases the return to implementing new technologies at a higher
productivity level and thus leads to lower implementation investments. It is crucial for
this interaction that both technology di⁄usion as well as obsolescence are endogenously
determined in our model.3
On the normative side, the consideration of an implementation margin provides an ad-
ditional growth policy instrument. Besides stimulating growth through R&D, the policy
maker can also consider stimulating growth by enhancing the intensity of adoption. As it
turns out, these two policy alternatives have very di⁄erent consequences. R&D subsidies
stimulate innovation and growth, but, at the same time, increase endogenous obsolescence
and thus reduce implementation. Stimulating implementation increases the rate of di⁄usion
of technologies which in turn increases the return to R&D and thus growth4.
The implementation decision in our model determines how far below their potential
productivity technologies are operated. When aggregating this gap over the technologies
available for production, our model yields an endogenous level of TFP, satisfying Prescott￿ s
3Endogenous growth and creative destruction do yield an endogenous rate of obsolescence but standard
models generally take the rate of di⁄usion of technologies as exogenous. This is the case, for example, in
Aghion and Howitt￿ s (1992) model of creative destruction in which technology di⁄usion is immediate and
in Dinopoulos and Waldo (2005) where di⁄usion occurs gradually but at an exogenous rate. Comin (2000)
and Comin and Gertler (2006) introduce models of both endogenous di⁄usion and endogenous growth but
these models di⁄er from ours in that the intensitity of adoption is not determined by the implementation
investments.
4Kok (2004) and Sapir (2003) emphasize the importance of policy measures beyond R&D subsidies and
tax credits to stimulate growth in the European Union. Many of the alternative policies emphasize the
importance of speeding up technology di⁄usion.
3(1997) request.
Ours is not the ￿rst model in which the distance from the technological frontier is endoge-
nously determined. There are basically two other mechanisms proposed that create such a
distance. The ￿rst is knowledge spillovers, which are considered, for example, by Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1997) as well as Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2002). Knowledge spillovers will
make certain agents or countries decide to fall behind the frontier and wait for the oppor-
tunity to imitate rather than innovate. The second is heterogenous adoption costs, either
in the form of entry barriers as in Parente and Prescott (1994), or because newly invented
technologies are not appropriate for the skill endowments in the economy, as in Basu and
Weil (1998) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001).
The concept of implementation is similar in spirit to the idea of appropriate technology.
However, where in the appropriate technology case productivity is exogenously determined by
the endowments of its users, the implementation decision that we consider here endogenously
determines the productivity of technologies, the intensity with which they are used, and the
rate at which they di⁄use.
One important virtue of our model is that it is quite tractable and yields a parsimonious
representation of the equilibrium dynamics of the relevant aggregates as well as closed form
solutions for the underlying di⁄usion curves that drive the aggregate dynamics.
Our model contains eight preference and technology parameters. Five of them are com-
mon to standard business cycles models and only three are new to the calibration literature.
We calibrate them exploiting information on the R&D share in the economy, the productivity
growth rate and micro estimates of learning by doing. This calibration permits a reasonable
quantitative analysis of our model economy.
We take advantage of the tractability of our model by not only analyzing its steady state
properties but also its transitional dynamics. Two of our most signi￿cant ￿ndings on this
front are; First, transitory perturbances to the model parameters and/or state variables have
permanent e⁄ects on the level of productivity. Second, despite having three state variables,
the responses of the detrended variables in our model to shocks to the capital stock are very
similar to the responses of these variables in the neoclassical growth model.
4The steady state welfare cost of the distortions in the economy is 7.6 percent. The policy
that restores the ￿rst best involves a subsidy to capital and to implementation and a tax on
R&D. This is in sharp contrast to standard endogenous growth models that do not include
the implementation margin.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. We introduce our model of endogenous
growth with technology implementation in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the positive
results of our analysis by considering the dynamic properties of the decentralized market
equilibrium allocation implied by our model. In Section 4, we introduce the normative part
of our analysis. In it, we consider the resource allocation that a social planner would choose,
compare it to the decentralized economy, and discuss policies that can support the planner￿ s
steady state allocation in the decentralized equilibrium. We conclude in Section 5. We leave
the mathematical details behind the main results presented in the text for the Appendix.
2 The model
The model economy that we consider consists of four sectors: a household sector, a ￿nal goods
sector, an intermediate goods sector, and an R&D sector. In this section, we introduce each
of these sectors separately. We consider the equilibrium outcome, when they interact, in the
next section.
2.1 Household sector
The representative household in our model economy is endowed with one unit of time that
it inelastically supplies at each instant. It also owns the capital stock that it rents to ￿rms
at a net rate rt: The household selects the path of consumption ct to maximize the present











subject to the standard ￿ ow budget constraint.




= ￿ (rt ￿ ￿)
2.2 Final goods sector
The ￿nal good consumed by households is produced using a set of intermediate goods. Let
yt denote the ￿nal good output at time t and let yit be the number of units of the ith
intermediate good used in production at time t. A new intermediate good is introduced
each instant. Therefore, the range of intermediate goods used in production at time t equals








where 0 < ￿ < 1
The market for the ￿nal good is perfectly competitive. Throughout, we use the ￿nal good
as the numeraire good and will normalize its price to unity. Let pit be the price of a unit of









2.3 Intermediate goods producers
Each intermediate good is provided by a single producer who owns a patent that ensures his
monopoly over the production of the good. Intermediate goods suppliers make two types of
decisions.
First, at every instant in time, they decide on factor demand decisions, the level of output,
and set the price of the intermediate good they supply.
5Caselli and Ventura (2000) have shown that, because the growth rate of consumption for a household
is the same independent of its level of wealth, the distribution of pro￿ts among households does not matter
for aggregate household behavior. Therefore, we ignore the issue of distribution of pro￿ts across households
in our model.
6Second, at the time they obtain the monopoly right to the supply of the intermediate
good, they decide at what initial productivity level to implement the intermediate good￿ s
technology. Over time, the producer will learn to produce his intermediate good e¢ ciently
and the gap between actual and potential productivity will eventually disappear.
We consider these two choices sequentially. We ￿rst solve for the optimal factor demands
and pricing rule taking as given the paths for productivity, factor prices, and ￿nal goods
demand. Then, we solve for the optimal implementation decision.
Factor demands and price setting:
Intermediate goods are produced using capital and labor that are combined using a Cobb-
Douglas technology of the form




it where 0 < ￿ < 1
The productivity level with which the ith intermediate good is produced, ait, is time-varying.
Labor and capital are homogenous and each intermediate goods producer hires them at
the competitive net rates wt and rt. The ￿ ow pro￿t accrued by the ith intermediate goods
producer at time t, ￿it, is
(6) ￿it = pityit ￿ wtlit ￿ (rt + ￿)kit
where ￿ denotes the capital depreciation rate.
The pricing and production decisions are static. Given the production and demand
functions, intermediate goods producers, therefore, set pit and demand lit and kit to maximize
(6). This yields factor demands that satisfy
(7) wt = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)pit
yit
lit
and rt + ￿ = ￿￿pit
yit
kit
and an optimal price equal to a constant gross markup factor, 1=￿ > 1; times the marginal





The resulting level of ￿ ow pro￿ts in each period is given by
(9) ￿it = (1 ￿ ￿)pityit;
7and the value of the ￿rm equals







Aggregation over intermediate goods:
As we show in the Appendix, the ￿rms￿decisions in the ￿nal and intermediate goods sector
aggregate to a production function of the form















Furthermore, the aggregate level of total factor productivity is given by a CES aggregate of










since this is a power mean of the productivity levels of all intermediates available, we will
refer to zt as average productivity.






























The aggregate factor demands turn out to satisfy the same optimality conditions as the
factor demands of the individual ￿rms in the sense that
(15) wt = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
yt
lt
and rt + ￿ = ￿￿
yt
kt
This aggregate production function representation allows us to rewrite the value of the ￿rm
as













8which depends on the paths of the ￿rm￿ s productivity level ait, aggregate productivity, zt,
the real interest rate, rt, output, yt.
Technology implementation:
Prior to starting production, intermediate goods producers decide at which productivity
level to implement the technology they use to produce their intermediate good. After that
moment, they learn to produce the intermediate good more e¢ ciently and the productivity
level ait increases until it reaches the potential productivity level of intermediate i, which we
denote by ai.
Just like in Parente (1994) and Basu and Weil (1998), learning occurs exogenously. We
de￿ne the implementation level of intermediate i at time t as
(17) xit = (ait=ai)
￿
1￿￿ , where xit 2 [0;1]
We assume that learning leads xit to evolve according to
(18) _ xit = ￿(1 ￿ xit)
where ￿ > 0 is the learning rate.















it for s > t:
Given this path of productivity, the value of the ￿rm can be written solely as a function of
its current productivity level and the paths of aggregate productivity, the real interest rate,
and output. That is, the value function simpli￿es to

































which is linear in the implementation level, xit.
This value consists of two terms. The ￿rst term is the present discounted value of the
￿rm￿ s ￿ ow pro￿ts if it would have implemented its technology at full potential, i.e. xit = 1.
9The second term is the loss in value due to the ￿rm￿ s productivity being below potential on
its learning curve.
Firms only decide where on their learning curve to start. The subsequent path of the
implementation level is determined by the exogenous learning process. We assume that new
intermediates are adopted at the moment that they are invented. This implies that, at each
moment in time, the ￿rm that obtains the monopoly rights to supply intermediate t has to
decide on its initial implementation level, xtt. Figure 1 depicts the productivity path, ait, of
intermediate i, implemented at time i at level xii and subsequently converging to ai due to
the exogenous learning process.
The implementation cost of good t at time t takes the form
(21) C
implement









[￿ln(1 ￿ xtt) ￿ xtt]











the fact that it is more costly to implement technologies whose potential productivity level,
at, is further from the average productivity level in the economy, zt.
The optimal implementation level, xtt, maximizes the di⁄erence between the value of the
￿rm and the implementation costs
(22) Vtt (xtt) ￿ C
implement
t (xtt)





























Intuitively, the marginal bene￿t of implementation is increasing in the term bxtyt while the
marginal cost is increasing in ￿z
1
1￿￿
t : The optimal implementation level is therefore increasing
in the former and decreasing in the latter.
10The resulting value at t of the ￿rm that produces the last good introduced net of imple-
mentation costs, i.e. the value of (22) in the optimal implementation level, equals
(25) V
￿











































Following Reinganum (1989) and Tirole (1988), we model the R&D process as a patent race.
One patent is awarded to the innovator who, within the instant, develops the intermediate
good with highest potential productivity.
Let gt denote the growth rate of potential productivity between the intermediate good






The intensity of research and development determines gt: In particular, the cost of in-
venting an intermediate good whose potential productivity represents a growth in the tech-

















gt for gt ￿ 0
where ￿ > 0 is the R&D cost parameter, z
1
1￿￿







re￿ ects the fact that it is more costly to develop technologies whose
potential productivity is further from the average productivity in the economy.
The R&D patent race between innovators brings the growth rate of the potential pro-
ductivity induced by intermediate good t to the point where the value of the intermediate

























The dynamic equilibrium allocation of resources in this economy can be described by a set
of di⁄erential equations. In this section, we present these equations, we transform them to
allow us to de￿ne a balanced growth path and transitional dynamics.
Crucial for the equilibrium path of the economy are three measures of productivity. The
￿rst is the potential productivity level of the newest intermediate that is introduced, at. The
second is the average potential productivity level at which all currently available intermediate










The third is the average productivity level, zt. Note that both the average productivity and
average potential productivity levels are aggregates that summarize the potential and actual
productivities across intermediate goods.
De￿nition: The equilibrium of this economy is a path of the variables
(32) fyt;ct;it;kt;xtt;bxt;b0t;gt;zt;zt;atg
that satis￿es the following 11 equations.
(i) The resource constraint that implies that the ￿nal good output is either consumed,
saved, used for implementation purposes, or used for R&D









(￿ [￿ln(1 ￿ xtt) ￿ xtt] + ￿gt)
(ii) The consumption Euler equation6, (2).
6The optimal capital input condition, (15), is what pins down the real interest rate in the Euler equation
as a function of the marginal revenue of capital.
12(iii) The aggregate production function, (11).
(iv) The capital accumulation equation
(34) _ kt = it ￿ ￿kt
(v) The optimal implementation level, xtt, given by (23).
(vi) Equilibrium R&D condition that determines the growth rate gt; (30).
(vii + viii) The expressions for the present discounted value coe¢ cients, bxt and b0t, given by (24)
and (26).
(ix) The law of motion for at, (27).




































Since ct; yt; kt; and it are not stationary on the equilibrium path, we transform them into
stationary variables before exploring the transitional dynamics and steady state. We do so
by scaling them by the average productivity trend z
1=(1￿￿)


































In addition, we de￿ne transformed present discounted value coe¢ cients as
b
￿
xt = bxt (38)
b
￿
















13Because our aim is to obtain a stationary representation of the equilibrium path, we detrend














Here, ￿t represents the gap between the potential productivity of the last intermediate
good invented and the average potential productivity level. We therefore refer to it as the
potential productivity gap. The second measure, ￿t, re￿ ects the gap between average potential
productivity and the average actual productivity level at which the current intermediates
are implemented. We call this the implementation gap.















The three state variables of the 10 equation system are k￿
t, ￿t, and ￿t.
3.1 Steady state
A steady state of this economy is an equilibrium path on which the ten transformed variables













As we prove in the Appendix, the steady state exists and is unique whenever














which is the case under the empirically plausible su¢ cient condition that ￿
1￿￿ > 1
1￿￿.7
The steady state is determined by the following equilibrium R&D zero pro￿t condition
(44) ￿e g = y
￿e b
￿







7We also derive the conditions under which the parameters are such that the household￿ s and intermediate
goods producer￿ s objectives are bounded on the balanced growth path.
14where the steady state level of output, y￿, is determined by the law of motion of aggregate




















(￿ + ￿ +  e g)
The left hand side of (44) re￿ ects the normalized steady state R&D expenditures, while
the right hand side corresponds to the normalized present discounted value of the pro￿ts net
of the costs of implementing a new intermediate goods technology.
Given e g, the optimal implementation level satis￿es
(47)
e x
1 ￿ e x
=
e y￿
￿ (￿ + ￿ +  e g)





Note that this expression is decreasing in e g. This is because an increase in the growth rate
increases the endogenous rate of obsolescence of new technologies. It does so through two
channels.
First, increased obsolescence reduces the steady state level of (detrended) capital and
thus of output, e y￿. This reduces the size of the market and the value of the ￿rm. Second,
e g increases the e⁄ective discount rate both through a higher interest rate, e r; and through a
higher replacement rate of demand by future, more productive, intermediate goods.8 Both
of these e⁄ects reduce the marginal value of implementing at a higher level and therefore
lead to a lower e x￿.
The steady state potential productivity gap equals




8There is a third e⁄ect of ~ g on the e⁄ective discount rate. Namely, the positive e⁄ect that ~ g has on
the growth of aggregate demand. Our assumption that   > 0 implies that this e⁄ect is dominated by the
previous two and therefore the e⁄ective discount rate is increasing in ~ g:
15while the implementation gap is
(49) e ￿ =
￿ + e ￿
￿ + e x￿e ￿
on the balanced growth path.
For completeness, the scaled steady state levels of capital, investment and consumption
are given by the following expressions:
(50) e k














￿ = e y
￿ ￿e i
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)e ￿e ￿[￿ (￿ln(1 ￿ e x) ￿ e x) + ￿e g]
Comparative statics of growth and implementation in steady state
Since we focus on the interaction between innovation and technology implementation, we
consider next how the steady state growth rate, e g, and implementation level, e x, vary as a
function of the R&D costs, ￿, the implementation costs, ￿, as well as the learning rate, ￿.
Table 1 summarizes the signs of these comparative static exercises. The details underlying
these results are presented in the Appendix.
The intuition behind these results is best understood through Figure 2. This ￿gure
depicts the steady state R&D free entry condition, (44), as the g-locus and the steady state
optimal implementation condition, (47), as the x-locus. The latter is downward sloping
because of the negative e⁄ect that increased obsolescence has on the implementation level.
The former is a vertical line because we have substituted the optimal implementation level
into the value of the intermediate good ￿rm that appears in the R&D free entry condition.
This ￿gure reduces the comparative statics of e g and e x to shifts in the g- and x-loci.
An increase in the R&D cost parameter, ￿, reduces the R&D e⁄orts of the innovators,
for a given x, causing an inward shift in the g-locus, and has no e⁄ect on the x-locus. As
a result, an increase in the R&D cost reduces the steady state growth rate, increases the
16present discounted value of demand faced by an intermediate good producer and leads to an
increase in the steady state implementation level.
An increase in the learning rate, ￿, makes ￿rms implement less and depend more on their
subsequent learning for a given g. Thus, the x-locus shifts inward in response to an increase
in the learning rate. On the other hand, ￿ increases the productivity growth rate for the
intermediate good ￿rm thus increasing its value and the return to R&D investments. As a
consequence, an increase in ￿ shifts the g-locus outward. The result is that, in response to an
increase in the learning rate, the steady state growth rate increases while the implementation
level decreases.
An increase in the implementation cost reduces the return to implementation for a given
g causing an inward shift in the x-locus. It also reduces the value of an intermediate good
￿rm and the return to innovation causing an inward shift in the g-locus. This means that
our diagram, in principle, does not su¢ ce to determine the sign of the e⁄ect of an increase
of ￿ on e g and e x. In the Appendix we show, however, that the downward movement in the
x-locus dominates the leftward shift of the g-locus in this case and that both the steady state
growth rate as well as the implementation level are decreasing in the implementation cost.
These comparative statics actually provide an interesting insight into the e⁄ects of two
alternative policies aimed at stimulating long-run growth: (i) subsidizing R&D, by reducing
￿, and (ii) subsidizing implementation and speeding up di⁄usion through reducing ￿. Both of
these policies will increase the long-run, steady state, growth rate. R&D subsidies, however,
come at the cost of reducing implementation and slowing down di⁄usion because of the
obsolescence cost it imposes. This is not the case for a reduction of implementation costs.
Such a reduction will also increase the implementation level and di⁄usion.
Technology di⁄usion
Underlying the steady state is a continuous process of di⁄usion of new intermediate goods.
Contrary to other models of endogenous growth, the rate of di⁄usion of (intermediate good)
technologies is endogenously determined in the model here. This rate of di⁄usion can be
considered in two ways.
17The ￿rst way is to consider the market share of an individual intermediate good. We will





















In the Appendix, we show that in the steady state
(54) sit =
￿




1￿￿e g(t￿i)e ￿e ￿
As shown in equation (55), two opposite forces drive the dynamics of the market share for ith
intermediate good: On the one hand, learning to produce e¢ ciently the intermediate good
induces a productivity gain that raises the market share. On the other, the increase in the
average productivity due to the development of new (more productive intermediate goods)
and to learning makes obsolete the ith intermediate good reducing its market share.





1￿￿e g(t￿i)e ￿e ￿ ￿







When the implementation costs are large the market initial share is so small that the learn-
ing e⁄ect dominates and the market share is initially increasing. As the market share in-
creases, the endogenous obsolescence of the intermediate good dominates and the market
share declines to zero.
An initially increasing and subsequently decreasing market share is consistent with ev-
idence on product life cycles documented in Jovanovic and McDonald (1994), Aizcorbe,
Corrado, and Doms (2000), and Kotler (2005).
The second way to characterize the rate of di⁄usion is to consider the share of expenses
in intermediate goods that are newer than good i: Given the factor demands (7), this is
equivalent to the fraction of workers employed in the production of an intermediate good










18As we show in the Appendix, on the balanced growth path, this adoption share follows a
di⁄usion curve of the form
(57) Sit = 1 ￿ e
￿ ￿
1￿￿e g(t￿i) ￿
e ￿ ￿ (e ￿ ￿ 1)e
￿￿(t￿i)￿
for t ￿ i
3.2 Transitional dynamics
The equilibrium dynamics of the model are determined by three state variables. Thus,
analytical results about the dynamic properties are beyond the scope of our analysis. We
resort, instead, to a numerical approximation of the transitional dynamics for a speci￿c set
of calibrated parameter values. The numerical approximation of the transitional dynamics
is based on the log-linearization derived in the Appendix.
Calibration:
The parameters that need to be calibrated are listed in Table 2. We calibrate our model
such that t is measured in years.
For the preference parameters, i.e. the discount rate, ￿, and the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, ￿, as well as for the capital depreciation rate, ￿, we use the parameter values
from Cooley and Prescott (1995).
Given our model￿ s emphasis on R&D and implementation, it seems particularly appro-
priate to use the evidence from Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2006, CHS in the following)
to calibrate most other parameters from our model. CHS provide an analysis of the sources
of growth of the U.S. business sector that includes extensive measures of intangible capital,
including R&D.
We calibrate the demand elasticity parameter, ￿, and the capital elasticity of output, ￿,
to match U.S. income shares reported by CHS. First, labor costs represent 60% of corporate
income. Second, returns to intangible capital represent 15% of the price. In our model these
are the pro￿ts that ￿ ow to the implementation and R&D costs.
The remaining parameters are the learning rate, ￿, and the implementation and R&D
cost parameters, ￿ and ￿. These parameters are chosen to match three observations, the
￿rst two of which are based on CHS. First, investment in R&D by the U.S. business sector
19is approximately 5.7% of corporate income. Second, adjusted for intangible capital, labor
productivity in the U.S. grew at an average rate of 1.9% a year over the 1973-2003 period.
Finally, we use evidence from Bahk and Gort (1993) on learning by doing in U.S. manufac-
turing plants. In particular, we choose our parameters to match their empirical result that
a 1% increase in a ￿rm￿ s cumulative output leads to a 0.028% increase in its TFP level.
The way in which we speci￿cally match the parameters with these facts is described in
Appendix A. The resulting values of the parameters are listed in the last column of Table 2.
Steady state:
The steady state values of the equilibrium variables are given in the ￿ equilibrium￿column of
Table 3. The resulting implementation level is about 4.3%, while the implementation gap is
4.6. The relatively low implementation level in steady state induces the market share of new
intermediates to increase at ￿rst and then to start decreasing after about 10 years. This can
be seen from the ￿ equilibrium￿curve in the top panel of Figure 3. That is, 10 years into the
life cycle of an intermediate in this economy the endogenous obsolescence starts to dominate
the learning e⁄ect. The implied di⁄usion curve is plotted as the ￿ equilibrium￿curve in the
bottom panel. In the decentralized equilibrium, 50% of the workers produce intermediates
that were invented less than 18 years ago.
Transitional dynamics:
We compare the transitional dynamics of our model with those of the standard Neoclassical
growth model, explained for example in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). That is, if growth
is exogenous, constant and equal to the steady state growth rate, e g, and if implementation
costs are zero, such that ￿ = 0, then our model boils down to the Neoclassical growth model
with a markup distortion9. In particular, we compare the dynamics in response to a 1%
deviation of capital above its steady state detrended level. Figure 4 contains the impulse
responses for the model with implementation, the ￿ implementation￿line, and the Neoclassical
benchmark, the ￿ NC benchmark￿line.
In the benchmark model the excess capital is used for current and future consumption
9The dynamic equilibrium equations of this restricted model are provided in the Appendix.
20through intertemporal substitution. The same is true in the model with implementation.
However, in the model with implementation there is not just intertemporal substitution
of consumption. An above trend capital stock increases the size of the market and thus
the present discounted value of the stream of future pro￿ts. This raises the bene￿ts from
innovation and implementation. As a result, the above steady state level of capital leads to
a transitory increase in the growth rate of potential productivity and in the implementation
level and to a permanent increase in the level of productivity.10 This is the main departure
of our model from the dynamics of the Neoclassical benchmark.
Relative to the Neoclassical model, the additional implementation and R&D expendi-
tures seem to come mainly at the cost of investment and not of consumption. What is
remarkable is that, in terms of the detrended variables, the impulse responses in the model
with implementation are very similar to that of the neoclassical growth model.
Our model has two state variables in addition to the capital stock: the implementation
gap and the potential productivity gap. Figure 5 plots the impulse responses to a 1% de-
viation of the these gaps from their steady state level. For comparison purposes, we have
also included the impulse response to capital. Increases in these two gaps increase imple-
mentation and R&D costs and therefore reduce both implementation and innovation. The
increase in the implementation and R&D costs induce a shift in resources from implementa-
tion and innovation to investment in physical capital. As a result, these changes induce very
signi￿cant transitory declines in the implementation level and the growth rate of potential
productivity and an important permanent decline in the level of productivity. There seems,
however, to be little or no e⁄ect on detrended consumption and detrended output.
4 Social planner solution
So far, we have focused on the decentralized equilibrium outcome of our economy. Next,
we explore the optimal innovation and implementation decisions from the social planner￿ s
perspective.




21In this section we derive the ￿rst order necessary conditions for the social planner￿ s
problem. We study the steady state implementation level, e xsp, and growth rate, e gsp, chosen
by the planner, and compare them with those resulting from the decentralized equilibrium.
Finally, we show how the planner￿ s steady state resource allocation can be supported through
taxes and subsidies in the decentralized equilibrium.




to maximize the present discounted value of the representative household￿ s stream of utility,
(1), subject to the resource constraint, (33), the ￿nal goods production function, (11), the
capital accumulation constraint, (34), the law of motion of potential productivity of the
newest intermediate, (27), the law of motion of average potential productivity, (35), and the
law of motion of average productivity, (36).










































































where ￿rt is the costate variable associated with the resource constraint, ￿yt is the costate
variable associated with the aggregate production function, ￿at is the costate variable asso-
ciated with the law of motion of potential productivity of the last intermediate good, ￿zt is
the costate variable associated with the law of motion of average potential productivity, and
￿zt is the costate variable associated with the law of motion of average productivity.
At any instant along the e¢ cient resource allocation path the planner equates the mar-
ginal utility cost of implementation to the shadow value of the marginal average productivity
that this implementation generates. This is represented by equation (60). The planner also
22equates the marginal utility cost of a better innovation, i.e. of gt, to the shadow value of the
additional potential productivity this innovation generates through at. Mathematically, this























4.1 Distortions in decentralized equilibrium
We characterize the full dynamics of the planner￿ s optimal resource allocation in the Ap-
pendix and focus here on the resulting steady state, also derived in the the Appendix. To
distinguish the planner￿ s steady state allocation from that of the decentralized equilibrium,
we denote the planner￿ s allocation with a superscript sp. Thus, e xsp and e gsp are the planner￿ s
steady state implementation level and growth rate respectively.























For a given growth rate, it is higher than the output level in the decentralized equilibrium,
because the monopolistic competition between the intermediate goods producers leads to an
ine¢ ciently low level of output in the decentralized equilibrium.
The steady state implementation level satis￿es
(63)
e xsp











￿ e ￿e ￿
e y￿sp [￿ (￿ln(1 ￿ e xsp) ￿ e xsp) + ￿e gsp]
#
e y￿sp
￿ (￿ + ￿ +  e gsp)
We call this the xsp-locus. It is the social planner￿ s counterpart to (47). This implies that,
given the growth rate, the planner￿ s implementation level is higher than that in the decen-
tralized equilibrium for three reasons. First, output in the planner￿ s allocation is higher,
therefore increasing the marginal bene￿t of implementation. Second, the monopolistic com-
petition also in￿ uences the marginal bene￿t of implementation because the ￿rms that imple-
ment in the decentralized equilibrium equate the marginal revenue product of implementation
to its marginal cost. The planner instead equates the marginal product of implementation
23to its marginal cost. Because of the downward sloping demand curves that the monopolisti-
cally competing intermediate goods producers face in the decentralized market, the marginal
revenue product is less than the marginal product and, hence, these ￿rms underimplement
relative to the social planner. This di⁄erence is re￿ ected in the 1=￿, term that pre-multiplies
the squared bracket in the RHS of equation (63). The ￿nal reason that, at a given growth
rate, the planner chooses a higher implementation level than is realized in the decentralized
equilibrium is that the planner internalizes the e⁄ect of the implementation level on the
implementation gap. A higher implementation level decreases the implementation gap and,
through that, reduces the implementation and R&D costs. This e⁄ect is re￿ ected by the
second term in the above equation.
The comparison of the steady state output and implementation levels above was done
conditional on the growth rate, e gsp. Given e xsp and e y￿sp, the e¢ cient steady state growth
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We call this the gsp-locus. The decentralized equilibrium counterpart of this equation,
which is a rewritten version of (44), reads
(65) 0 = ￿
￿￿
￿ + ￿ +  e g
￿ +  e g
￿
e x
1 ￿ e x
+ ln(1 ￿ e x)
￿
￿ e g￿
For a given implementation level, there are three di⁄erences between the optimal innovation
condition in the decentralized equilibrium, (65), and that of the social planner, (64).
First, the patent race that determines the R&D intensity in the decentralized economy
equalizes the value of the intermediate good producer net of innovation and implementation
costs to 0. The social planner, instead, equalizes the marginal value and the marginal cost of
innovation. The (scaled) marginal cost of innovation is ￿ > 0: Hence, the patent race leads
to too much innovation in the decentralized equilibrium relative to the planner￿ s.
Second, the planner internalizes the fact that g leads permamently to a higher ￿ a
￿
1￿￿:
As a result, the marginal social value of innovating is higher than the market value of the
24intermediate good porducer, for a given x, for two reasons. On the one hand, a higher g
increases potential productivity levels in all future times. Hence the discounting in the RHS
of (64). On the other hand, g increases the growth rate of ￿ a
￿
1￿￿ by ￿
1￿￿ g: Hence, the term
￿
1￿￿ that pre-multiplies the marginal social value of ￿ a in the right hand side of equation (64).
Because the xsp-locus is above the x-locus for all growth rates, the planner￿ s steady state
can not be such that both the growth rate and the implementation level are below that of
the decentralized steady state. Figure 6 adds the planner￿ s gsp- and xsp-loci to Figure 2. It
shows the three possible cases of the planner￿ s steady state compared to the decentralized
one: (i) e gsp < e g and e xsp > e x; (ii) e gsp > e g and e xsp > e x; and (iii) e gsp > e g and e xsp < e x.
4.2 Supporting the planner￿ s solution
We do not formally characterize these three cases, but instead describe the policies that
support the social planner￿ s steady state equilibrium in the decentralized economy. Such a
policy analysis serves two main purposes. First, it allows us to consider how private costs and
bene￿ts can be corrected to coincide with those in the e¢ cient resource allocation. Second,
it helps us understand how optimal R&D policies interact with policies aimed at a⁄ecting
the implementation and adoption of technologies.
The decentralized and social planner￿ s steady states generally di⁄er in the R&D intensity,
in the implementation level, and in the saving rate. To align these three margins in the
decentralized equilibrium with those in the planner￿ s allocation, it is necessary to use three
instruments.
The instruments we consider to decentralize the social planner￿ s steady state are an R&D
subsidy, sg, a subsidy to implementation, sx, and a subsidy for capital, sk. These subsidies
can potentially be negative, and thus be a tax. We assume that these subsidies are ￿nanced
by a lump-sum tax or subsidy that balances the government￿ s budget. Because of the non-
distortionary nature of this lump-sum tax, we do not focus on it in our analysis.
We derive the optimality conditions in the decentralized equilibrium under the subsidies
in the Appendix. In order to see how the distortionary subsidies can be used to support
the planner￿ s solution, we consider each of the optimality conditions that they a⁄ect in the
25decentralized equilibrium sequentially and compare them with those of the planner￿ s steady
state.
Conditional on the other subsidies supporting the planner￿ s growth rate and implemen-












Hence, the optimal capital input subsidy is sk = 1 ￿ ￿. This corrects for the distortion
induced by the monopolistic competition between the intermediate goods suppliers. In the
decentralized equilibrium, this distortion leads to an undersupply of output, a less than
e¢ cient level of capital, and thus a lower than optimal saving rate. The capital subsidy
increases the private marginal return to capital to o⁄set this.
To support the optimal implementation level, conditional on supporting e y￿sp and e gsp, the
implementation subsidy has to satisfy
(67)
e xsp
1 ￿ e xsp =
1
(1 ￿ sx)￿ (￿ + ￿ +  e gsp)
e y
￿sp
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#
> 1
sx corrects for the two e⁄ects that are not internalized in the decentralized implementation
decision: (i) The e⁄ect of monopolistic competition on equilibrium pro￿ts, re￿ ected by (1=￿);
(ii) the e⁄ect of the implementation decision on the implementation gap and thus on the costs
of implementing and inventing. Because both of these e⁄ects lead to underimplementation
in the decentralized equilibrium relative to the e¢ cient allocation, the optimal policy in this
context always involves a subsidy to implementation.
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which, combined with (64), allows us to write
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26Thus the optimal R&D subsidy consists of two parts. The ￿rst part corrects for the wedge
between private and social implementation costs induced by the implementation subsidy sx.

















Intuitively, the social bene￿ts from innovation are, in large part, determined by the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution of the representative consumer because the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution together with the discount rate, ￿, and the growth rate of the economy,
is what determines the e⁄ective discount rate at which the planner discounts the future gains
from current innovation investments.
When the representative consumer has a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution, i.e.
￿ < 1, the planner heavily discounts future gains from current R&D investments. Hence,
the e¢ cient allocation involves devoting fewer resources to innovation than the decentralized
economy. In that case, the optimal R&D subsidy would be lower than the implementation
subsidy and potentially involve a tax on innovative activities.
Conversely, when the agent is more willing to intertemporally substitute consumption
today for consumption tomorrow, i.e. ￿ > 1, the present discounted value of the social
payo⁄s from R&D are larger and the social planner prescribes more growth than in the
decentralized economy.
Besides the insights that we obtained on how the distortions in the decentralized equi-
librium can be corrected using the optimal choice of three policy instruments, we obtained
another important insight. The optimal R&D and implementation policies are inherently
intertwined. This implies that any policy discussion about stimulating or reducing the in-
centives to innovate should also take into account the incentives to implement and adopt the
innovations.
4.3 Quantitative evaluation
To illustrate the planner￿ s steady state, we consider it for the calibrated parameter values
of Table 2. The ￿ planner￿column of Table 3 shows the e¢ cient allocation of resources for
27the same parameters as the decentralized equilibrium outcome we discussed in Subsection
3.2. For the calibrated parameter values, the decentralized equilibrium would have too
little growth and implementation. At 1.38%, the e¢ cient growth rate is half a tenth of
a percentage point higher than that in the market equilibrium. Moreover, the e¢ cient
implementation level is 6.75%, which is almost 2.5 percentage points higher than in the
decentralized equilibrium.
These distortions in the market implementation level and growth rate means that tech-
nologies di⁄use at an ine¢ ciently low rate. To see this, compare the e¢ cient ￿ planner￿
di⁄usion curves with the decentralized ￿ equilibrium￿ones in Figure 3. The e¢ cient 50%
di⁄usion time in the bottom panel of the ￿gure is about 16 years, while the 50% di⁄usion
time in the market equilibrium is closer to 18 years.
The misallocation of the resources in the decentralized economy cause a signi￿cant welfare
loss. Welfare in the steady state of the decentralized equilibrium is 7.6% lower than that
resulting from the planner￿ s allocation. At a constant growth rate, this would amount to
0.36% of steady state consumption. This is more than 40 times larger than the welfare cost
for log preferences of consumption ￿ uctuations around a linear trend estimated by Lucas
(1987).
The optimal policy derived above can o⁄set the resource misallocation caused by the
model￿distortions in the decentralized equilibrium. For our calibrated parameter values, the
optimal policy involves a 15% capital input subsidy, a 35% implementation subsidy, and a
7% R&D tax.
These policies are in sharp contrast with the policy prescriptions of standard endogenous
growth models that do not include the implementation margin. These generally yield an
optimal R&D subsidy rather than a tax, as in Jones and Williams (1998, 2000).
If, in our economy, the government tried to implement the optimal policy ignoring im-
plementation, i.e. assuming ￿ = 0, it would choose a capital input subsidy of 15% and an
R&D subsidy of 59%.11 This, however, would lead to a 5% loss in welfare relative to the
policies derived above, which represents only a 2% improvement over doing nothing.
11The optimal policies for an economy without implmentation are derived in the Appendix.
285 Conclusion
We have introduced the technology implementation decision in a theory of endogenous
growth. In our model, the implementation decision determines the initial productivity of
the technology to produce a new intermediate good. The gap between the potential and the
actual productivity of the new technology is closed over time through exogenous learning.
Our model is su¢ ciently tractable to analyze not only its steady state but also its transitional
dynamics. The addition of a technology implementation decision to an, otherwise, standard
model of endogenous growth leads to two important insights.
First, the equilibrium e⁄ect of growth on implementation is the opposite of the e⁄ect of
implementation on growth. An increase of the growth rate increases the rate of endogenous
obsolescence of technologies. It reduces the present discounted value of pro￿ts and therefore
the bene￿t and level of implementation. An increase in implementation leads to a more
intensive adoption of new technologies and raises the market value of the ￿rms that produce
them. This raises the return to R&D, and thus leads to an increase in long-run growth.
Second, optimal policy in our model does not only involve R&D taxes or subsidies but
also requires intervening in the cost of implementation. This suggests that any discussion of
policies to stimulate long run growth should not only consider subsidizing the activities of
innovators, but, just as importantly, consider subsidizing the implementation, and through
it the di⁄usion, of the technologies that these innovators create.
The model that we analyzed here is basically a stylized model of the world technology
frontier and, as such, the normative results in this paper could be interpreted as applying
to a ￿ world growth policy￿ . In practice, such policies are not decided on at a global level,
but, instead, are chosen by national governments. The consideration of optimal national
implementation policies versus R&D tax credits becomes even more relevant when it is done
in a multi-country context with R&D spillovers. This is the subject of our future research.
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32Figure 1: Path of technology speci￿c productivity
Table 1: Comparative statics of decentralized steady state
Sign of partial derivative of... with respect to...
R&D cost implementation cost learning rate
￿ ￿ ￿
Growth rate e g - - +
Implementation level e x + - -
33Figure 2: Determination of steady state growth rate and implementation level
Table 2: Model parameters
parameter interpretation value
1. ￿ discount rate 0.050
2. ￿ intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1.000
3. ￿ reciproce of gross markup factor 0.850
4. ￿ capital elasticity of output 0.300
5. ￿ learning rate 0.017
6. ￿ implementation cost parameter 216
7. ￿ R&D cost parameter 115
8. ￿ capital depreciation rate 0.050
Calibration based on t being measured in years.
34Figure 3: Steady state di⁄usion curves
35Figure 4: Comparison of transitional dynamics with Neoclassical growth model
36Figure 5: Transitional dynamics in response to shocks in all three state variables
37Figure 6: Determination of planner￿ s steady state growth rate and implementation level
Table 3: Steady state values in decentralized equilibrium and social planner￿ s allocations
variable interpretation equilibrium planner
e g growth rate 0.0133 0.0138
e x implementation level 0.0431 0.0675
e ￿ implementation gap 4.5857 4.2991
e ￿ potential productivity gap 0.0754 0.0784
e y￿ output 1.3863 1.4823
e c￿ consumption 1.0916 1.1171
e i￿ investment 0.2050 0.2590
e k￿ capital 2.9706 3.7132
Welfare in the decentralized equilibrium is 7.6% lower than in the planner￿ s allocation.
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